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Over the years a few authors have argued that Rawls’s ideal theory of justice is useless 
for the real world. This criticism has been largely ignored by Rawlsians, but in the light 
of a recent accumulation of such criticisms, some authors (in particular Holly Lawford-
Smith, A. John Simmons, Zofia Stemplowska and Laura Valentini) have tried to defend 
ideal theory. In this article I will recapitulate the precise problem with Rawls’s ideal 
theory, argue that some of Rawls’s defenders misconceive it, and show that recent 
attempts to rescue Rawls’s ideal theory from the charge of being useless fail. While there 
are useful kinds of ideal theory, Rawls’s is not one of them. In addition, Rawls’s very 
tentative suggestions for some kind of bridge between ideal and non-ideal theory are 
contradictory insofar as they implicitly presuppose the non-existence of the problem they 
are meant to solve. Thus, Rawls’s “non-ideal theory,” too, is useless, and not so much a 
theory at all but a set of ad hoc stipulations. Finally, I will show that certain attempts 
within the global justice debate to use some variation of the original position to directly 
derive guidelines for the real world are misguided and yield no useful results. 
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I. The Problem with Rawls’ “Ideal Theory” 
 
Rawls limits1 his “ideal theory” of justice to “the basic structure of society conceived for 
the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies,”2 and also conceived as a 
society in which everybody acts justly and does his part in upholding just institutions.3 
That is, he introduces (at least4) two “idealizations,” namely the closedness condition and 
the strict compliance condition, and limits his “ideal theory” of justice to societies where 
these two conditions are fulfilled. In still other words, Rawls’s “ideal theory” of justice 
tells us this: 
RITJ: Under the conditions of closedness C and of strict compliance SC with the 
principles of justice that parties to the original position would choose, the basic 
structure of a society is just if and only if it fulfills the two Rawlsian principles of 
justice RPJ. 
Thus, we can define an “ideal theory” as a theory that tells us what would be the case if 
                                                
1 Or better: he claims to limit it in this way. In fact, however, he also talks about natural 
individual duties, not only about the basic structure. 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), p. 7. 
3 Ibid., e.g. p. 8 and 308-9. 
4 It also seems that Rawls at least implicitly conceives of the society in question as one 
containing only people capable of co-operation (at least at some point in their lives). 
However, there is no need to go into this here. I will stick to his two most famous 
idealizations.  
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certain non-realized conditions were realized. Obviously, for rather straightforward 
logical reasons (the antecedent of the implication is wrong), RITJ, like any other “ideal 
theory” of justice and morality, be it Rawlsian or not, does not by itself tell us what 
would be just or how we ought to behave in the real world, that is, in our world, where, 
as it happens, C and SC do not hold.5 (Note that I do not claim that it implies by itself 
nothing about the real world. I do not need to make such a claim, though, and I will 
return to the issue below.) 
This inapplicability argument cannot be overcome by claiming “that it relies on the 
premise that an ideal theory contains only criteria of (ideal) justice” and that “a moral 
theory such as a theory of justice contains more than the slogan that summarizes its 
conclusion,” for example, “a theory of value.”6 Such remarks miss the point of the 
inapplicability charge, since there is no need for such a premise. An ideal theory of 
justice, as defined here, has the form of a conditional sentence (like RITJ), and if  “a 
theory of value” appears on the side of the antecedent and is thus “contained” within the 
                                                
5 Annette Baier, “Theory and Reflective Practices,” in her Postures of the Mind: Essays 
on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 207-27, at 
210, correctly notes: “The real moral guidance comes when we are told not how the law 
of an ideal community would apply to a concrete case in that ideal world, but when we 
are told [what] we should therefore do, in this nonideal world.” Simmons and other 
defenders of Rawls quote from Baier’s article, but it seems that they do not quite 
appreciate the logical force of her point. 
6 Eva Erman and Niklas Möller, “Three Failed Charges Against Ideal Theory,” Social 
Theory and Practice 39(1) (2013), pp. 19-44, at 30. Erman and Möller are also mistaken 
in categorizing the inapplicability problem as “epistemological” (ibid, pp. 27 and 31); 
rather, it is a logical problem. 
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ideal theory, it has not yet been asserted; and if it appears on the side of the consequence 
and is thus “contained” within the ideal theory, it has still not yet been asserted: all that 
has (at best) been asserted in that case is that this theory would be correct if the 
antecedent were correct (but in ideal theory, of course, the antecedent is not correct). 
Thus, the structure and the idealized antecedent of an ideal theory make sure that 
whatever theory of value is “contained” within this ideal theory has no normative force as 
long as it does not escape this containment. That is the charge. 
Of course, Rawls book entitled A Theory of Justice contains more than the ideal 
theory, but pointing out this obvious fact certainly does not save the ideal theory that the 
book contains from the charge in question. The charge, again, is not that a conjunction of 
an ideal-theory-conditional with something else, for example with a simple normative 
assertion, cannot contain something that is directly applicable to the real world. The 
conjunctions “RITJ and you should not torture babies for fun” or “If there are no planets, 
then fascism is just, and you should not torture babies for fun,” for instance, do contain 
an applicable normative statement, and the former conjunction is not superior to the 
latter. However, the applicable normative statement that the conjunctions contain, namely 
that you should not torture babies for fun, is quite able to stand on its own. Conjoining 
applicable and true normative assertions with ideal theories helps neither the latter nor the 
former. 
Thus, the charge that RITJ does not by itself tell us what would be just or how we 
ought to behave in the real world stands. Consequently, the two claims that in a certain 
real society a basic structure that fulfils RPJ is unjust and that in a certain other real 
society a basic structure that does not fulfill RPJ is just are entirely compatible with RITJ, 
with Rawls’s “ideal theory” of justice. This means that Rawls’s bold claim (which, as it 
seems, is endorsed by Simmons and many other defenders of Rawls) that his “two 
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principles of justice provide an Archimedean point for appraising existing institutions”7 
does not make too much sense. Making existing institutions conform more to Rawls’s 
principles might actually make them less just. (I will have to say more about this latter 
point shortly.)  
To be sure, at times Rawls recognizes that there might be a severe problem with his 
“ideal theory”:8 
We must ascertain how the ideal conception of justice applies, if indeed it applies at 
all, to cases where rather than having to make adjustments to natural limitations, we 
are confronted with injustice. The discussion of these problems belongs to the 
partial compliance part of nonideal theory. It includes, among other things, the 
theory of punishment and compensatory justice, just war and conscientious 
objection, civil disobedience and militant resistance. These are among the central 
issues of political life, yet so far the conception of justice as fairness does not 
directly apply to them.9 
Unfortunately, Rawls’s does not at all “ascertain” that his theory applies to the real 
                                                
7 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 456, my emphasis. Compare also pp. 215, 216 and 231. 
8 I use quotation marks because Rawls’s “ideal theory” is anything but ideal. Incidentally, 
Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel have the same problem as Rawls. While they and 
some of their followers, unlike Rawls, dedicate lengthy discussions to it, they certainly do 
not solve it. On this point (for Habermas) see Uwe Steinhoff, The Philosophy of Jürgen 
Habermas: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Ch. 2.5, and 
(for Apel) Kritik der kommunikativen Rationalität: Eine Darstellung und Kritik der 
kommunikationstheoretischen Philosophie von Jürgen Habermas und Karl-Otto Apel 
(Paderborn: Mentis, 2006), Ch. 3.6.2. 
9 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 309, see also 215-6. 
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world, whether “directly” or indirectly – he just assures the reader that it does. Those 
assurances, however, remain entirely unsubstantiated.10 
But can’t “ideal theory” be made to tell us what would be just or how we ought to 
behave in the real world? Well, while it is logically impossible for Rawls’s or any other 
“ideal theory” to tell us such things by itself, it can of course do so in conjunction with 
certain further assumptions. However, first, it has to be noted that those assumptions 
necessarily cannot be part of “ideal theory” anymore; and second, the question arises as 
to how plausible those additional assumptions are and how they can be justified. 
An additional assumption that makes “ideal theory” relevant for the real world in the 
respect at issue can be called a bridging-principle. Here is one: 
BPLD: If RITJ is correct, that is, if, under the conditions of closedness C and of 
strict compliance SC with the principles of justice that parties to the original 
position would choose, the basic structure of a society is just if and only if it fulfills 
the two Rawlsian principles of justice RPJ, then any society in which one of these 
conditions is not fulfilled is just if and only if it is a liberal democracy. 
If Rawls’s theory of justice is correct, then this is not an ideal principle, since ex 
hypothesi its antecedent (namely RITJ) is correct. While, however, this bridging principle 
makes RITJ indirectly applicable to the real world, it does not succeed in making it 
useful. For it is “natural to assume” – to borrow one of the expressions Rawls uses when 
assuring us of the relevance of “ideal theory” – that for any justification of BPLD there 
would be a much simpler justification for the justice of liberal democracies that would 
explain their justice under real circumstances in a straightforward manner, that is, 
                                                
10 A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 38(1) 
(2010), pp. 6-36, e. g. at pp. 10 and 12, quotes several of Rawls’s assurances to this 
effect. It probably goes without saying that quoting them is not the same as showing that 
they are correct. 
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without taking the awkward detour through “ideal theory.” What, then, do we need “ideal 
theory” for?11 (And a justification of BPLD would be direly needed; after all, there is an 
infinite supply of other possible bridging principles that could compete with BPLD, for 
example BPBA, “BA” for “benevolent absolutism.” ) 
The situation does not change if one develops a bridging principle by elevating the 
idealizations contained in “ideal theory” to a political ideal, into a utopia one should 
strive for. This is what Rawls sometimes suggests, and it is definitely Simmons’ strategy. 
He states: 
To this … complaint about counterfactual assumptions and “significant 
falsehoods,” the appropriate Rawlsian response seems simple and straightforward. 
Rawls’s ultimate target—the ideal of his ideal theory—is the most just institutional 
structure that can be achieved within the constraints set by the more or less 
intractable aspects of human nature and the nature of the world. Fleshing out and 
arguing for such an ideal requires the use of counterfactual assumptions …12 
So while having identified our ultimate objectives is hardly “of little use” in 
addressing real societal problems of injustice, it is perfectly fair (as we have also 
seen) to observe that practical political prescriptions cannot be expected to be easily 
                                                
11 For a fine discussion of the failure of methods of “bridging the gap between a set of 
political principles and morality appropriate to ideal conditions and a set of political 
principles and a morality appropriate to the imperfect circumstances within which we live 
out our lives,” see Michael Phillips’ seminal article, “Reflections on the Transition from 
Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory,” Nous 19(4) (1985), pp. 551-570, esp. pp. 561-66. Curiously, 
Simmons nowhere mentions Phillips (nor, to my knowledge, does Rawls). 
12 Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” p. 31. 
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extracted from ideal theory.13 
Thus, the bridging principle implied here is this (UTC stands for “Utopia to come”): 
BPUTC: If RITJ is correct, that is, if, under the conditions of closedness C and of 
strict compliance SC with the principles of justice that parties to the original 
position would choose, the basic structure of a society is just if and only if it fulfills 
the two Rawlsian principles of justice RPJ, then we should strive for a society that 
satisfies conditions C and SC. 
The problem is that neither Rawls nor Simmons provide any justification for this 
principle, and that Simmons overlooks a few things in his “simple and straightforward” 
response.14 First, he paints a somewhat rosy picture of the ideal of Rawlsian “ideal 
theory.”15 Second, he also ignores the fact that Rawls offers us at least two “ideals”: one 
on the level of domestic theory (The Theory of Justice) and another on the level of 
international theory (The Law of Peoples). 
Let me explain. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that the first ideal depicts 
a closed society – a detail Simmons does not mention – in which everyone abides by the 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 32. 
14 Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” p. 6, claims, incidentally, that “those who 
criticize the Rawlsian approach [to ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal theory’] (in the remarkably thin 
literature that actually addresses the distinction) seem mostly to dismiss it as flawed in 
relatively simpleminded ways.” Leaving aside the fact that the Rawlsians’ failure to 
address this issue reflects rather badly on Rawlsians and “ideal theorists,” not on the 
critics, my argument here is of course that it is Simmons’ (and other authors’) attempt to 
show that Rawlsian “ideal theory” is relevant for the real world that is relatively 
“simpleminded.” 
15 Ibid., p. 32, the passage starting with “Ideal theorizing says …” 
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Rawlsian principles of justice. Yet how anyone, in our times, can in all seriousness offer 
a closed society as political ideal (the German Democratic Republic was comparatively 
closed, thanks to the Berlin Wall, and so is North Korea) is difficult to understand. A 
closed society, irrespective of its other merits or demerits, certainly does not qualify as 
“the most just institutional structure that can be achieved.” 
The second ideal (which contradicts the first one, so that Simmons and Rawls should 
at least clarify which ideal it is that we should strive for) describes an open international 
society, which comprises so-called “liberal” and so-called “decent” national societies 
(none of them closed). The decent ones express their decency among other things by 
treating part of their citizenry as second-class citizens, denying them an equal standing. 
The liberal societies, on the other hand, show their liberality among other things by their 
disrespect towards the second-class citizens in the “decent” societies – they show this 
disrespect by deeming an international society just that comprises such “decent” national 
societies and hence the corresponding maltreatment of certain innocent human beings.16 
Is this really supposed to be “the most just institutional structure that can be achieved” on 
an international level? 
I have come across the objection here that neither Simmons nor Rawls suggest 
elevating a closed society to an ideal, and that they therefore do not need to justify 
BPUTC. The first part of this charge is true – but misses the point – the second is not. To 
wit, my point here is that if you defend the idealizations in Rawls’s “ideal theory” by 
claiming that they (at least partly) constitute an ideal you should strive for, then you 
cannot just let one of those idealizations fall under the table only because it is convenient. 
That would simply be cheating.17 And therefore it is indeed quite appropriate to point out 
                                                
16 Rawls, of course, develops his international utopia in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 11-58.  
17 I have also come across the objection that closedness is a “methodological” idealization 
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that Simmons conspicuously fails to mention the closedness condition when he describes 
the “ideal.” However, once the closedness condition comes into the picture again – where 
it belongs – BPUTC is the principle you would need to justify. 
But, for the sake of argument: assume we just drop (without any justification, of 
course) the closedness condition anyway. Would that give us a worthy ideal? No, it 
would not, for the problem Rawls himself mentioned would just return in a different 
form: why should a society that fully complies with principles of justice that have been 
designed for closed societies be a worthy ideal in an open world? 
The answer is, of course, that it is not a worthy ideal. To see this, let us take a more 
critical look at Rawls’s formulation of the two principles of justice. Rawls formulates 
those principles as referring to persons. But why? (Characteristically, this question has 
neither occurred to Rawls nor to Rawlsians.) Given that the parties to the original 
position labor under the full-compliance and closedness assumptions18 and are, moreover, 
not guided by moral concerns, but instead by their own rational self-interest,19 and given 
further that they know that they are to decide on the principles of justice for their own 
                                                                                                                                            
while full compliance is not. The fact of the matter, however, is that, first, it is irrelevant 
for my argument what kind of idealization the two idealizations are, and second, Rawls 
nowhere says that the two idealizations are different in kind.  
18 I readily admit, however, that dropping the closedness assumption in the original 
position would not help much either. See Uwe Steinhoff, “Unsavory Implications of A 
Theory of Justice and The Law of Peoples: The Denial of Human Rights and the 
Justification of Slavery,” The Philosophical Forum 43(2) (2012), pp. 175-196, esp. at 
181-183.  
19 Rawls (1999), p. 12. 
 11  
“association” or society,20 that is, given that they know that they are insiders, that they are 
members of their society – given all this, there is absolutely no reason for them to grant 
outsiders any moral standing whatsoever.21 To do so would simply be irrational.22  
Thus, the principles that the parties to the original position would actually choose 
would have to be formulated, for example, as follows (the important changes are in 
italics): 
(1) Each citizen of a society is to have an equal right against his society to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all members of the society. 
(2) Social and economic inequalities within a society are to be arranged so that they 
are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members within the society, 
consistent with the just savings principle, and  
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all members of the society under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity for all members of the society. 
Of course, the principles of “the law of peoples” would also have to be reformulated 
accordingly, namely in such a way that they give only liberal and decent states any rights. 
After all, for liberal and decent peoples in the international original position it would 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 10, 102, 119. 
21 Thus, Rawls’s conception amounts in effect to what Allen Buchanan calls and 
criticizes as “justice as self-interested reciprocity” in his “Justice as Reciprocity versus 
Subject-Centered Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19(3) (1990), pp. 227-252, at 
229.  In the past, Buchanan has denied this (ibid., p. 230, n. 6), but meanwhile he seems 
to agree (personal communication). 
22 I have argued for this at length in “Unsavory Implications.” 
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likewise be irrational to give other peoples (let alone “outlaw states”) any moral 
standing.23 But this has the consequence that the “ideal” of a society (or of a world-
society) that is fully compliant with the principles of justice that would actually be chosen 
in the original position is the ideal of a society (or world-society) that is completely 
compatible with the members’ of one society enslaving or exterminating the members of 
another society.24 That is hardly a worthy “ideal.” 
(At this point, incidentally, I have met with the further objection that criticizing the 
content of Rawls’s idealizations seems to be irrelevant if I want to show that Rawls’s 
theory is inapplicable. But as I already said, I do not want to show that. I want to show 
that it is useless. I first claimed that his theory is by itself not directly applicable to the 
real world. This means that by itself it provides no practical guidance whatsoever. This is 
the first sense of “useless.” Second, the indirect application of the theory, as we will see 
below, does not provide us with anything that other theories could not also provide, and 
that much more efficiently. Thus, the theory is superfluous. This is the second sense of 
“useless.” Third, if we combine the theory with a bridging principle like BPUTC – or 
even with a bridging principle that omits the closedness condition – then this combination 
actually is directly applicable. However, it has utterly absurd and thus clearly 
unacceptable implications. This is the third sense of “useless.” To show, however, that 
the theory cum bridging principle has absurd implications obviously requires that we 
discuss “content,” and this is precisely what I am doing at the moment.) 
Moreover, even the second idealization, strict compliance, might be far less appealing 
than it might first appear. Simmons talks about what “can be achieved within the 
                                                
23 Ibid., p. 190-193. 
24 Again, for the elaborate version of this argument, see ibid. By the way, being indignant 
about and dismissive towards this argument, as I have experienced Rawlsians to be, is not 
quite the same as refuting it. 
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constraints set by the more or less intractable aspects of human nature and the nature of 
the world.” Respecting those constraints is a feature of what Rawls calls a realistic 
utopia.25 However, the assumption that there can ever be a society where everyone abides 
by the Rawlsian principles of justice all the time is certainly not compatible with the 
intractable aspects of human nature26 (therefore, incidentally, the parties to the original 
                                                
25 Rawls (2001), pp. 7 and 12-13. 
26 As Colin Farrelly, in “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55 
(2007), pp. 844-864, at 845, rightly notes: “… by assuming full compliance, ideal 
theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia.” A Rawlsian critic has commented 
that one cannot show that the strict compliance assumption is not compatible with human 
nature by quoting Farrelly. Actually, I do not quote Farrelly as evidence but to give him 
credit for his observation. The actual evidence both Farrelly and I rely on, in contrast, is 
the long, brutal history of humanity, which teaches some very obvious lessons. This 
evidence cannot be made to disappear by quoting Rawls. Another critic claimed that a 
“charitable” interpretation of Rawls would relax the full compliance assumption. 
However, in reply, such “charity” would come at the price of accuracy: it would ignore 
what Rawls is explicitly saying in A Theory of Justice. Of course, in Justice as Fairness: 
A Restatement (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2003), p. 13, Rawls unceremoniously – as if this where not a major deviation from his 
earlier statements and in need of some explanation – qualifies the requirement that 
“everyone strictly complies” with the principles of justice by putting, in brackets, a 
“(nearly)” before it. This cavalier attitude of his is quite inappropriate: the full 
compliance assumption cannot be “relaxed” without thereby running into the 
insurmountable problem that I diagnose below in the context of Brock and Moellendorf. 
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position, far from being rational, must suffer from severe cognitive shortcomings: they 
make precisely this utopian assumption of strict compliance while simultaneously 
knowing “the general facts about human society” and “the laws of human psychology”27 
– this just doesn’t add up). 
One of the facts of human psychology that is not compatible with the assumption of 
everyone behaving justly all the time is people’s partiality towards their friends and loved 
ones. Sometimes people will commit injustices, however slight, to promote their own 
friends and family members. Thus, striving for complete justice seems to involve striving 
for complete impartiality. Complete impartiality, however, is incompatible with love and 
friendship. (As many theologians, philosophers, poets and novelists have noted, some 
evils cannot be eradicated without also eradicating certain goods.) One is necessarily 
partial towards ones friends and beloved ones – this is partly what friendship and love 
mean. 
Yet, it is dubious at best that the ideal of a fully just society can justify the sacrifice of 
love and friendship. To be sure, Rawls claims that justice “is the first virtue of social 
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.”28 But whether this is so or not, complete 
justice is not the first virtue of societies or persons, and justice is certainly not the only 
virtue. An ideal society, to deserve the name, has to balance different virtues in an 
adequate, human and humane way instead of sacrificing all other principles and values to 
the apotheosis of one.  
A further problem with the bridging principle BPUTC is one I have already mentioned 
above in another context: since the basic structure of a society where we do not have full 
compliance might be just only when it does not conform to Rawls’s principles of justice, 
striving towards a Rawlsian ideal might actually move us away from justice. While this, I 
                                                
27 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 119. 
28 Ibid., p. 3. 
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submit, is a rather obvious logical point, and one that is well documented by the literature 
on “the problem of the second best,”29 an example might help to make it still clearer.  
I have repeatedly pointed out that Rawls does not offer us anything more than mere 
unsubstantiated assurances for the practical relevance of his “ideal theory.” One such 
unsubstantiated assurance is this: “It is clear from the preceding remarks that we need an 
account of penal sanctions however limited even for ideal theory.”30 At least Rawls 
admits that such an account would be limited;31 but he is not willing to admit what is 
obvious: “ideal theory” cannot provide any room for penal sanctions. After all, the parties 
to the original position, at all four stages of the four-stage sequence,32 “assume that the 
principles they acknowledge, whatever they are, will be strictly complied with and 
followed by everyone.”33 However, if they assume that, they obviously must also thereby 
assume that sanctions or even as much as the mere threat of sanctions are superfluous.34 
If, for example, they consider “Driving on the right side is just and imposing sanctions on 
anyone or threatening to do so is unjust” to be a principle of justice, then they will 
                                                
29 The locus classicus is R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of 
Second Best,” The Review of Economic Studies, 24(1) (1956-58), pp. 11–32. 
30 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 212. 
31 See also ibid., p. 277. 
32 Ibid., pp. 171-5. 
33 Ibid., p. 308-9. Incidentally, Rawls’s concern about stability is due to the strict 
compliance assumption a red herring, as far as ideal theory is concerned. 
34 Incidentally, the idea of actual sanctions within a fully just society is incoherent. If 
everybody behaves justly, any sanction imposed would necessarily be imposed on an 
innocent person and therefore constitute an injustice. Then, however, the society would 
not be fully just anymore. 
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assume that in case they choose this principle everybody will drive on the right side while 
nobody will threaten to impose any sanctions on anyone. Moreover, if a penal system is 
superfluous, it is also unjust, for it would be a waste of public funds and thus clearly not 
compatible with Rawls’s principles of justice. Rawls is not willing to fully admit this 
state of affairs because his claim that his “ideal theory” of justice is a standard for the 
assessment of real institutions looks particularly tenuous if in “ideal theory” there is not 
even room for a penal system – the latter, after all, being a rather important constituent of 
just basic structures in the real world. 
As regards the “preceding remarks” Rawls mentions, they are entirely beside the 
point. At best one remark he makes in the “preceding remarks” might at least at first 
glance have a connection to Rawls’s assurance “that we need an account of penal 
sanctions however limited even for ideal theory.” He claims: 
It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-ordered society the coercive powers 
of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social cooperation. 
For although men know that they share a common sense of justice and that each 
wants to adhere to the existing arrangements, they may nevertheless lack full 
confidence in one another. … By enforcing a public system of penalties 
government removes the grounds for thinking that others are not complying with 
the rules. For this reason alone, a coercive sovereign is presumably always 
necessary, even though in a well-ordered society sanctions are not severe and may 
never need to be imposed.35 
In fact, however, these remarks do not lend any support to his claim that penal 
sanctions play a role even in “ideal theory;” on the contrary, they lend support to my 
claim that taking guidance from “ideal theory” leads one astray in the real world. First of 
all, a well-ordered society is not necessarily a society of strict compliance: the claim that 
                                                
35 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 211. 
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sanctions may never need to be imposed suggests that it is conceptually possible that 
sanctions sometimes do need to be imposed in a well-ordered society – which, of course, 
is incompatible with the assumption of strict compliance. Second, that penal sanctions 
and the threat thereof might make more people abide with just principles and thus lead to 
more justice is precisely my point and certainly does not contradict my claim – which I 
justified above – that parties to the original position would oppose a penal system when, 
in conformity with “ideal theory,” they simply assume strict compliance. Only people 
who try to secure a high degree of compliance will opt for penal sanctions, not people 
who take strict compliance as a given. 
These considerations show that people attempting to make the basic structure of their 
society more just under real circumstances should not take their lead from “ideal theory” 
– getting rid of penal sanctions, after all, does not make society more just under the 
circumstances of the real world. 
Perhaps Simmons might object here that one has to strive for all aspects of the ideal at 
once: improving compliance while simultaneously, perhaps somehow proportionately to 
the degree of heightened compliance, “reducing” (whatever that means exactly) the penal 
system. However, this is obviously a goal conflict: if you want to improve compliance, 
reducing the penal system is not a good idea. 
Giving the trade-offs involved, one will have to rely on some intuitionist assessment 
of what changes in reality actually count as coming closer to the ideal. But this makes 
Rawls’s “ideal theory” doubly intuitionistic: it is, first, intuitionistic with regard to the 
weighing and balancing of certain side-constraints Rawls imposes on the methods one 
uses to achieve “the perfectly just basic structure” (Simmons), and second, also “the 
measure of departures from the ideal is left importantly to intuition” (Rawls36).37 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 216. 
37 Simmons knows this, of course. See “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory,” pp. 12 and 18-30. 
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Simmons thinks that this still doesn’t hinder “ideal theory” itself from being non-
intuitionist,38 but so what? Rawls wants to reduce the necessity to appeal to intuitions 
with his theory; he wants to deliver something that is better than intuitionism.39 However, 
intuitionism does not need any appeal to “ideal theory” in the first place. It is directly 
applicable to the real world. Rawls’s theory, in contrast, first sets up an ideal, then needs 
intuition to measure how far the real world is away from that ideal, and then also needs 
intuition in order to balance the side-constraints operating on methods used to come 
closer to the ideal. Rawls’s theory, far from being an improvement over intuitionism, is 
only an entirely unnecessary complication. 
In any case, since we cannot achieve the dubious ideal of full compliance and the 
appalling ideal of closedness anyway, we are well advised, morally and prudentially, to 
only try to achieve what we indeed can achieve and therefore to give up on the “ideal” of 
closedness and strict compliance altogether. Rather, if anything, we ought to try to make 
the basic structure fully just under the actual conditions of openness and partial 
compliance. (A critic commented on this point that “a society in which there is only 
partial compliance will never be ‘fully just’ because it contains non-compliers.” That, 
however, is as true as it is irrelevant. I talked about the basic structure here, not about 
society, and since Rawls constantly talks about the basic structure of society, he 
obviously distinguished the two things. As a penal code or a law against rape can be fully 
just even if – or perhaps precisely because – there are non-compliers, so a basic structure 
can be fully just although society does not live up to its regulations.) 
In that context it also needs to be noted that Simmons’s constant talk about “the most 
just institutional structure that can be achieved” or about “the perfectly just basic 
structure” shows that he does not really understand the “complaint about counterfactual 
                                                
38 Ibid., p. 28. 
39 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 30-40. 
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assumptions” he himself is complaining about. The point (or one of the points) is that 
Rawls’s “ideal theory” is entirely incapable of offering a description of the perfectly just 
basic structure or of the perfectly just society: it at best offers, to repeat it once again, a 
description of what a perfectly just basic structure would be like under the conditions of 
closedness and strict compliance. Provided the right background conditions, societies or 
basic structures can be perfectly just in a million other ways besides in living up to 
Rawls’s principles of justice.40 Some of those conditions are actually real. Thus, there is 
no need, and certainly no reason, to rely on Rawls’s unrealistic dystopia(s). 
 
 
II. Is there a point to unrealistic assumptions? 
 
Yes, of course there is, and therefore there can be useful ideal theories, as we will see by 
the example of Fritz Allhoff’s theory below (their use, however, will never lie in telling 
us what is just or moral in the real world: no ideal theory can do this without a bridging 
principle). However, that does not help Rawlsian “ideal theory” at all. Indeed, Rawls’s 
theory completely misses the point that wrong assumptions can have. Before returning to 
that, however, let us have a look at what defenders of Rawls take to be the benefits of the 
wrong assumptions in Rawls’s theory. Simmons thinks that this is “fairly plain”: 
First, of course, if we compare the operation of societies ordered by competing 
principles of justice while assuming strict compliance with those principles, the 
                                                
40 See in this context also Robert E. Goodin’s suggestion of “indexing our political 
prescriptions to socio-economic circumstances” in “Political Ideals and Political 
Practice,” British Journal of Political Science 25(1) (1995), pp. 37-56, at 56.  
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different effects we observe can reasonably be taken to be wholly the responsibility 
of the different ordering principles themselves. So our comparison turns out to be 
quite strictly a comparison only of the principles of justice. If instead we try to 
evaluate principles in terms of how societies governed by them would operate with 
a “normal” amount (or a certain percentage) of noncompliance with them 
(supposing we can even make sense of that hypothesis), we will likely find both 
that our evaluations yield quite indeterminate results and that the results depend on 
more than simply the different ordering effects of the principles being compared.41 
Actually, full compliance is not the only idealization in Rawls’s theory. Thus, at best 
we would have a comparison of principles under certain conditions, in this case under the 
unrealistic and unappealing condition of closedness. Second, we would have a 
comparison not just of the principles by themselves, but of full compliance with different 
principles under different conditions. And what does this tell us about the real world? 
Very little. To repeat the point again: even if fully complying with Rawls’s two principles 
of justice under conditions of closedness would produce a fully just society, this does not 
mean that implementing those principles of justice in the real world would lead to more 
justice. It might well lead to much less justice. 
Besides, it seems that experts in the field of comparative politics are quite able to 
compare “principles in terms of how societies governed by them would operate with a 
‘normal’ amount (or a certain percentage) of noncompliance.” Of course this might often 
need extrapolation and perhaps a certain amount of speculation, but it is certainly nothing 
one cannot make sense of. 
                                                
41 Simmons, “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory,” p. 8. 
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Zofia Stemplowska also thinks that false assumptions can be useful. She claims: 
Notice then that tackling broad problems … inevitably requires making some false 
assumptions. For example, to theorize at a certain level of generality, we will have 
to make some approximations that, being approximations, will be false, but that 
will also be necessary to make any progress at all. In addition to making 
approximations, theorists may have to pretend that certain difficulties do not arise 
or they will never be able to say what justice, on the whole, requires …42 
However, first, Stemplowska only claims, but does not show, that there is anything 
“inevitable” about this. Second, Rawls’s “ideal theory” of justice does not say what 
justice is “on the whole,” but only what justice is under the conditions of closedness and 
full compliance. Third, while it is true that theories and models can be quite useful 
although they only approximate the truth – they can be useful if other theories and 
models do not even manage to accomplish that – one is well advised to keep in mind that 
the following is not correct: “If a theory of justice T correctly claims that under 
conditions X a basic structure B would be just, then under conditions that approximate X 
a basic structure that approximates B would be approximately just.” It might well be the 
case that the slightest deviation from the conditions X would require a dramatic deviation 
from B in order to keep the basic structure even approximately just (as, again, the “theory 
of the second best” confirms43). If Rawls or Rawlsians think that such a dramatic 
                                                
42 Zofia Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?”, Social Theory and Practice 
34(3), (2008), pp. 319-340, at 327. 
43 See n. 28. Erman and Möller interestingly claim that “as shown by Goodin, the 
problem of ‘the second best’ is not a criticism of ideal theory but concerns the inevitable 
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deviation is not required in the case of Rawls’s theory, they would have to provide an 
argument for that. They don’t. In fact, they don’t even notice the problem. Last but not 
least, the conditions of closedness and strict compliance do not approximate reality; 
rather, they are entirely removed from reality. 
Stemplowska’s further remarks on the significance of “ideal theory” simply 
presuppose that Rawls’s “ideal theory” has provided us with an ideal worth striving for, 
indeed with the ideal (with the ideal of justice “on the whole”). I have already dealt with 
these mistaken assumptions when discussing Simmons above and shall say no more 
about them. 
Yet, Stemplowska also tries to defend the full-compliance assumption in particular. 
She states: 
                                                                                                                                            
problem of tradeoffs that appear if we attempt to realize several competing or conflicting 
ideal conditions simultaneously.” See their “Three Failed Charges against Ideal Theory,” 
p. 31. However, this problem clearly is a problem for ideal theory, and this is, pace 
Erman and Möller, exactly what Goodin says, precisely using the example of Rawls’s 
ideal theory. See Goodin, “Political Ideals and Political Practice,” pp. 54-55. His two 
suggested remedies to this problem of ideal theory do not help ideal theory but obviously 
make it superfluous: first, searching for principles that are “relatively insensitive to their 
setting,” and second, “indexing our political prescriptions to socio-economic 
circumstances” (ibid, p. 56). This idea of “indexing” is of course nothing more than the 
idea that what is just under some circumstances, for example under those of the idealized 
world, is not yet just under other circumstances, for example under those of the real 
world. Thus, looking to the former will not give us guidance for the latter. 
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But if people do not always act as they should, then the assumption of full 
compliance guards us from making our demands too permissive towards those who 
are simply unwilling to comply with reasonable limits on the permissibility of their 
actions. What motivates the assumption of full compliance, then, is the worry that 
without it the normative requirements we come to acknowledge will be normatively 
inaccurate. The assumption of full compliance guards us from accepting, as David 
Estlund has put it, the implausible dictum that “ought implies reasonably likely.”44  
What is this supposed to mean? That, for example, without assuming that there is no 
rape or murder on Earth we would be more lenient towards rapists or murderers (who, by 
the way, is even capable of making such unrealistic assumptions in the real word – we 
are not parties to the original position, after all)? Isn’t rather the opposite the case, that is, 
if we assumed there is no rape, our attitude towards rapists would be like our diluted 
attitudes towards fictional characters? Certainly we would not consider it a societal 
problem. We would consider it, thanks to our other-worldly assumption, to be no problem 
at all. 
But probably Stemplowska means something else: without an idea of what an ideal 
world without rape (or murder) would be like, we would be more lenient towards rapists 
(or murderers). But that is clearly wrong, too. People tend to be against rape because they 
have some idea about what rape is like. Because they know that, they are against it. They 
do not need “ideal theory.” 
                                                
44 Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?”, p. 332-3. Stemplowska is quoting 
David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 265. 
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Laura Valentini also tries to save “ideal theory,” or at least some “ideal theory.” She 
thinks there is a “principled way of distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ uses of 
idealisations.”45 Her way of trying to do this, however, is unconvincing, particularly so 
with regard to Rawls’s “ideal theory.” She first correctly identifies the most serious 
charge against “ideal theory” as this: 
ideal theory ‘is at best morally irrelevant, at worst morally destructive’. This charge 
can be summarised as follows: if we apply principles developed under ideal 
conditions to real-world circumstances—namely those circumstances for which 
they have allegedly been designed—we are bound to obtain morally 
counterintuitive results.46 
However, she then goes on to argue that Rawls’s domestic “ideal theory” engages in 
“good” idealizations while his international “ideal theory” engages in “bad” ones. Yet, in 
arguing the former she suddenly misrepresents what she had previously identified as the 
most serious charge and now claims that it states that certain “omissions are not harmless: 
by neglecting to discuss racial and sexual discrimination, ideal theory loses its capacity to 
guide action in the real world.”47 And she then tries to refute this charge by arguing, 
quoting Rawls, that an omission is not as such a fault.48 
But of course omissions are not as such a fault, and nobody has denied this. Theories 
                                                
45 Laura Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 17(3) (2009), pp. 332–355, at 352. 
46 Ibid., p. 341. Valentini quotes here Baier, Postures of the Mind, p. 225. 
47 Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory,” p. 343. 
48 Ibid., p. 343-7. 
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need not be applicable to everything. In addition, a theory does not even need to discuss 
certain things explicitly in order to be applicable to them. Rawls’s theory of justice, for 
example, is straightforwardly applicable to racial and sexual discrimination under 
conditions of closedness and strict compliance. Rawls’s theory flatly implies that if racial 
and sexual discrimination does not conform to Rawls’s two principles of justice, then 
racial and sexual discrimination are wrong under conditions of closedness and strict 
compliance. But this is precisely the charge: Rawls’s theory implies such things about a 
situation of strict compliance and closedness, but these implications cannot tell us what is 
just or unjust in the real world; they are irrelevant for the real world. And there is 
certainly nothing in Valentini’s discussion to show otherwise. Thus, her discussion of the 
domestic case simply misses the point of the criticism. 
When discussing Rawls’s international theory of justice, however, she again presents 
the point correctly: Rawls’s description of the idealized world “does not apply, i.e., it is, 
technically, irrelevant to existing circumstances, which is precisely what [the most 
serious charge] claims.”49 And she agrees that this charge is correct. But of course, as we 
saw, it is no less correct with regard to Rawls’s domestic theory. 
That her distinction between good and bad Rawlsian “ideal theory” is mistaken can 
also be seen by examining her attempt to show how exactly the difference comes into 
being. She claims that in Rawls’s domestic “ideal theory” “the subject of justice,” namely 
the basic structure, does not “end up being idealized.” But, allegedly: 
Things look different when we turn to The Law of Peoples … As for Rawls’s 
international theory, this asks how almost self-contained political communities 
                                                
49 Ibid., p. 348. 
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ought to behave towards one another, on the assumption that, since they are well-
ordered, a just (fair) background is in place. But because real-world societies are 
not well-ordered, such a background does not exist, and it is precisely its absence 
that gives rise to the question of international justice in the first place.50 
Actually, the subject of the respective theory of justice is in both cases, in the domestic 
and in the international one, a “basic structure.” That is what the parties to the original 
position deliberate about, and that is what the theory deals with. Clearly, I do not need to 
remind anyone of this with regard to Rawls’s domestic theory. But with regard to his 
international theory, it might be useful to quote Rawls saying this: 
Thus, people’s representatives are … deliberating about the correct subject, in this 
case the content of the Law of Peoples. Here we may view that law as governing 
the basic structure of the relations between peoples.51 
 Thus, there is no difference. In A Theory of Justice the basic structure is governed by 
the two principles of justice. In The Law of Peoples the “basic structure” is governed by 
the principles of the Law of Peoples. In neither of the two theories are the principles 
“idealized” (whatever it may mean to idealize a principle). In both theories the 
background conditions are idealized: full compliance and closedness there; well-ordered 
societies that fully comply here. The idealizations in both theories, being idealizations, 
are unrealistic, and therefore both theories are inapplicable to real societies and basic 
structures. Hence Valentini’s attempt to save one of those theories from this charge fails. 
                                                
50 Ibid., p. 351. Incidentally, I am not aware of Rawls stating anywhere that those 
communities are “almost self-contained.” 
51 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 33. 
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Holly Lawford-Smith’s attempt to save Rawls’s “ideal theory” is not successful either. 
She in fact and very surprisingly argues “that there are no idealized assumptions in Rawls 
…, there are just counterfactual statements that are either true or false of individuals as 
they actually are. If the counterfactuals are true, a certain world is justified as a good 
one.”52 How so? She explains: 
Consider an analogue. If orchestras had conducted their auditions blind (e.g. with 
those auditioning obscured from the view of those selecting) before 1970, there 
would have been a greater proportion of women in the world’s best orchestras at 
that time. The antecedent of the counterfactual is false, because orchestras did not 
begin the practice of blind auditioning until fairly recently. But it seems remarkably 
likely that the conditional itself is true, because the proportion of women in 
orchestras has increased dramatically since the introduction of blind auditions. And 
something seems to follow from the truth of that conditional, namely that blind 
auditioning is something we should be committed to. It’s just the same with the 
counterfactuals in Rawls and Dworkin. If their counterfactual conditionals are 
true—if we are in a position to choose principles of justice, if we are on the desert 
island—then they have some normative force. If people would choose certain 
principles of justice were they not made blind and selfish by their psychological 
limitations, then perhaps those principles of justice should be in place. 
What I’m suggesting is that far too much attention goes into attacking the 
antecedents of the counterfactuals, with objections like ‘yes, but people aren’t 
                                                
52 Holly Lawford-Smith, “Debate: Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 18(3) (2010), pp. 357-68, at 363. 
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really like that, so nothing follows for real people!’53 
However, the fact of the matter is that Rawls’s ideal (domestic) theory of justice, 
summarized in RITJ above, is not a counterfactual about persons at all. It is a 
counterfactual about basic structures; and it is designed to be exactly that. 
More importantly still, Lawford-Smith misses the point of the critics of “ideal theory.” 
They do not necessarily criticize the veil of ignorance; they criticize the fact that Rawls’s 
“ideal theory” of justice is limited to basic structures under the conditions of closedness 
and strict compliance, conditions that do not hold in the real world and thus make the 
theory inapplicable to the real world. To be sure, there is a connection between those 
idealizing conditions and the original position: after all, the parties to the original position 
assume that their societies will be closed and will be societies of full compliance. The 
limitations are made operational in the original position by precisely these assumptions. 
And precisely these assumptions are the ones the critics of “ideal theory” criticize: 
idealizations about the societies for which principles of justice are chosen. They do not, 
however, necessarily criticize that the parties to the original position are idealized. 
Lawford-Smith is right in suggesting that the parties to the original position are idealized; 
they are, as she says, “not blinded by envy, not risk-takers, not imperfectly rational.”54 
However, the parties themselves do not assume that there will be no envy, no risk-taking 
and no imperfect rationality in the societies for which they choose the principles, as 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. Of course, one might doubt that being fanatically risk-averse is “ideal.” 
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Rawls makes perfectly clear.55 Thus, this is no idealization at all in the sense intended by 
the critics of “ideal theory.” 
Thus, to avoid distorting the actual issue Lawford-Smith would at least, if she insists 
on talking about the original position, have to identify the right counterfactual in that 
context, which would be this one: “If, behind a veil of ignorance, rational people not 
blinded by envy and risk-taking were to choose principles of justice for their society and 
if they also made the entirely unrealistic assumption that their society will be closed and 
blessed with strict compliance, then they would choose the principles of justice X.” Yet, 
unsurprisingly she does not explain why this counterfactual should be able to justify 
anything with regard to real societies. 
Thus we have to modify her orchestra “analogue” a little in order to get a real analogy 
to the counterfactual that is actually at issue. This is one possibility that suggests itself: 
“If orchestras would conduct their auditions blind (e.g. with those auditioning obscured 
from the view of those selecting) and also made the entirely unrealistic assumption that 
whomever they would choose would fully comply with their standards, they would just 
randomly choose whoever shows up for the audition.” What does this show or “justify” 
with regard to how we should conduct auditions in the real world? Nothing. 
Finally, allow me to say something about the curious comparison both Valentini and 
                                                
55 “The motivation of the persons in the original position must not be confused with the 
motivation of persons in everyday life who accept the principles of justice and who have 
the corresponding sense of justice. … Thus, more generally, the motivation of the parties 
in the original position does not determine directly the motivation of people in a just 
society.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 127-8. 
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Lawford-Smith (the latter following the former) draw between Galileo’s Law of Falling 
Bodies (or his frictionless plane thought experiment) and Rawls’s “ideal theory.” 
Valentini states: 
Famously, Galileo’s Law of Falling Bodies is elaborated under the idealised 
assumption that friction does not exist. In spite of it being ‘false’ of existing falling 
bodies, such an idealised assumption is widely regarded as appropriate for 
theoretical purposes. Galileo’s Law is not charged with being unsound because it is 
arrived at by assuming friction away. … In fact, friction can be taken back into 
account when such a Law is employed to make predictions about falling bodies in 
the real world.56 
And Lawford-Smith concurs: 
I think Galileo’s thought-experiment idealizes its subject and yet is none the worse 
for it. It assumes away friction, then makes a prediction about how bodies should 
behave. When we apply the theory, we build real-world complications like friction 
back into the story. One way of understanding what we are doing is that we specify 
an ideal, the way things behave in simplified or ideal conditions, such as in worlds 
without gravity, and then we relax the assumption of ideality by reintroducing real 
complications, like friction. This seems to apply equally to Rawls’s ideas about 
international justice …57 
A few comments are in order. First, Galileo does not develop his Law of Falling 
Bodies under the idealized assumption that friction does not exist. He rather says that if 
                                                
56 Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory,” p. 354. 
57 Lawford-Smith, “Debate: Ideal Theory,” p. 365. 
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there is no friction, the bodies will behave as he says they will. In some parts of the world 
(namely those we call vacuum) there indeed is no friction. Thus, his Law, even if 
formulated as a conditional (“If there is no friction, then…) – which is not even necessary 
in modern physics, where you can get rid of the idealization by using equations about 
forces – is directly applicable to large parts of the real world. That is more than can be 
said about Rawls’s theory. 
Second, if we made the idealizing assumption that there is friction everywhere in the 
real world, then Galileo’s law, formulated as a conditional with a now wrong antecedent, 
would by itself be equally inapplicable to the real world as RITJ. For example, it would 
not tell us whether objects falling in an environment with friction would fall faster or 
slower than in a vacuum, would come to a grinding halt and then go on falling, or even 
reverse course. It would be useless. 
Fortunately for Galileo Galilei, however, he differs from Rawls by providing more in 
his theory than just that one conditional law. Instead, he described a lot of real world 
cases and gave plausible, detailed and quite accurate explanations of how to factor 
friction in again, stating that friction would slow down objects, have a greater effect on 
light objects than on heavy ones, etc. – thus enabling his readers to use his theory to make 
concrete predictions about the real world. Rawls, in contrast, does not offer anything 
plausible or detailed or quite accurate by way of explaining how his “ideal theory” of 
justice is to be brought to bear on the real world. 
Lawford-Smith actually seems to admit that much, albeit only in the last footnote of 
her article: 
This claim that ideal standards can be relaxed relies to some extent upon there 
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being a bridge from ideal to non-ideal theory, and there seems to be only one 
proposal on the table about how that bridge might work. See (Murphy 2000). I 
don’t have in mind a formal algorithm for the relaxation from ideal standards, so if 
that is necessary then my proposal will be vulnerable until a plausible bridge is 
established.58 
First, Lawford-Smith not only has no formal algorithm for the “relaxation from ideal 
standards” in mind; she offers no bridging principle at all, whether in the form of an 
algorithm or a metaphor. Second, Murphy’s proposal is not so much a bridging principle 
but in need of a bridge itself. His central principle, the compliance condition, goes: 
Agent-neutral principles should not under partial compliance require sacrifice of an 
agent where the total compliance effect on her, taking that sacrifice into account, 
would be worse than it would be (all other aspects of her situation remaining the 
same) under full compliance.59 
This principle fails to be action-guiding as long as it is not explained what full 
compliance requires (and Murphy does not explain that; thus, he has developed his “non-
ideal theory” before his “ideal” one), it has counter-intuitive implications in many 
realistic scenarios,60 and, most importantly in our present context, it is certainly not a 
                                                
58 Ibid., p. 367, n. 21. 
59 Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 80. 
60 See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, “Moral limits on the demands of beneficence?”, 
in Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 33-58, esp. at 36-7. 
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bridging principle for Rawls’s principles of justice at all: it does not tell us how Rawls’s 
principles of justice should be “relaxed,” to use Lawford-Smith’s expression, to apply to 
the real world. Rawls’s principles of justice are simply not Murphy’s concern. 
However, Michael Phillips (whom Lawford-Smith does not mention) has at length 
considered strategies to bridge the gap between Rawlsian “ideal theory” and the real 
world, and rightly discarded them all.61 Perhaps in an idealized world where we would 
have a bridging principle “ideal theory” might be applicable, but, again, we are not living 
in an ideal world; we are living in the real one. We have now been waiting for 40 years to 
be presented with a viable bridging principle, but nothing remotely plausible has been 
offered – in fact, Rawlsians and ideal theorists have quite simply ignored the problem. 
Most will continue to do so, and it is to be expected that none of them will solve it. For 
those interested in the real world, it is time to move on.  
 
 
III. Good “Ideal Theory” and Bad “Ideal Theory” 
 
Thus, the fact remains that Rawls’s “ideal theory” is useless. This statement is quite 
compatible with the admission that making wrong assumptions and philosophizing about 
idealized or even outrageously unrealistic circumstances can make very good sense. 
Philosophers, after all, (or at least quite a number of them) use hypotheticals all the time. 
To use one example, Fritz Allhoff has developed what I will call here Allhoff’s “ideal 
theory of torture” (that is not his choice of terms). Allhof develops an highly idealized 
                                                
61 Phillips, “Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory.” 
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ticking bomb example (there are ticking bomb examples that are not idealized, 
incidentally62) and states that this case shows or at least intuitively strongly suggests “that 
torture is permitted in highly idealized cases and is completely silent about whether 
torture would be permitted in other (less idealized) cases.”63 Thus, he is well aware of the 
limitations of “ideal theory.” Yet, he thinks that the idealized case is still relevant for 
practice, namely in this way: 
I directly argue against Kantianism (and other views with similar commitments) on 
the grounds that, if they cannot accommodate the intuitions in [idealized] ticking 
time-bomb cases, they simply cannot be plausible moral views … I postulate that, 
even if this paper has dealt with idealized cases, it paves the way for the 
justification of torture in the real world by removing some candidate theories (e.g., 
Kantianism) and allowing others that both could and are likely to justify real-world 
torture.64 
This is a useful indirect application of “ideal theory” to the real world, whether or not 
one agrees with Allhoff’s conclusions as to the justifiability of torture. Unfortunately, 
though, there is no such useful application of Rawls’s theory. First of all, while Allhoff’s 
                                                
62 See Uwe Steinhoff, “Defusing the Ticking Social Bomb Argument: The Right to Self-
Defensive Torture”, Global Dialogue 12(1) (2010), http://ftp4.dns-
systems.net/~worlddiag/index.php, the section entitled “Straw Man Idealisations.”  
63 Fritz Allhoff, “A Defense of Torture: Separation of Cases, Ticking Time-bombs, and 
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64, at 246. 
64 Ibid., p. 243, abstract. 
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idealized ticking bomb case really tests our intuitions and it is an empirical fact 
(acknowledged by absolutist anti-torture opponents and confirmed by unpublished 
empirical research of Allhoff’s) that most people will find torture justifiable under those 
extreme idealized conditions, Rawls does not test our intuitions at all, despite all his talk 
about “reflective equilibrium.” Instead, he argues that the parties to the original position 
will choose the principles of justice he proposes if they are to choose those principles for 
a closed society blessed with strict compliance. However, he has designed those parties 
for the purpose of doing that in the first place, so the whole enterprise looks like 
legerdemain (a point made by many critics of Rawls). If, however, we are talking about 
“us” or most people (even if we are only talking about most people in liberal 
democracies), it is simply not true that “we” or they find the Rawlsian principles of 
justice compelling principles for a situation of closedness and strict compliance.65 Rawls 
does not clarify or reveal our intuitions in the least. 
Second, and even more importantly, let us suppose Rawls’s “ideal theory” of justice 
were correct (which it is not). Where would its indirect applicability come from? Let us 
have a look at the structure of Allhoff’s argument again. Roughly, it goes like this: if 
Kantianism is right, torture is prohibited under all circumstances.66 The idealized ticking 
bomb case shows that torture is not prohibited under all circumstances. Thus, Kantianism 
is wrong. If Kantianism is wrong, however, it cannot be used as an argument against 
                                                
65 See Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 54-7, where she reports empirical evidence to this effect 
gathered by, among others, Frohlich and Oppenheimer. 
66 Just for the record: I disagree with Allhoff on this issue. 
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torture anymore – neither in the idealized world, nor in the real world. Thus, certain 
arguments for torture that could only be stopped by Kantianism would now have to be 
accepted – and this is obviously a very relevant result for the real world. 
 What would the parallel argument in the case of Rawls’s theory be? What theory or 
view does it refute? Well, it would refute utilitarianism and libertarianism – and this 
would make it indirectly applicable to the real world and thus useful, wouldn’t it? Not 
quite. It would indeed make it indirectly applicable, but it would not make it useful if 
“useful” is supposed to be incompatible with being superfluous. For while, on the 
assumption that Kantianism indeed implies an absolute prohibition of torture, Allhoff’s 
idealized ticking bomb example is an extraordinarily strong hypothetical if it comes to 
undermine the conviction that torture is prohibited under absolutely all circumstances, 
there are certainly much better and widely available thought experiments than the one 
provided by Rawls’s voluminous “ideal theory” to undermine libertarian and utilitarian 
intuitions (thought experiments, for example, about torturing babies in order to maximize 
happiness or about letting babies drown in the puddle in front of you although you could 
save them by slightly moving your toe).  
Thus, Rawls’s theory of justice, if correct, would, for example, undermine real-world 
utilitarian or libertarian arguments in support of totalitarian dictatorships or Manchester 
capitalism – something other thought experiments achieve much more economically, 
efficiently and convincingly. It would not, however, show that other arguments for 
totalitarian dictatorships must be wrong, that totalitarian dictatorships are unjust in the 
real world, that we should strive for one of the Rawlsian “ideals” in the real world, or that 
we should make our basic structures in the real world conform more to Rawls’s principles 
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of justice. It would, in short, show that some justificatory doctrines or arguments are 
invalid in the real world, but it would not tell us what is just and what we should do in the 
real world. It is and remains useless: an unnecessary complication that offers absolutely 
nothing to make it superior to intuitionism. 
 
 
IV. What “Non-Ideal Theory”? 
 
I have used the terms “ideal theory” and “non-ideal theory” in quotation marks 
throughout the paper. The reason for this is that I think that a useless theory is anything 
but ideal; and while I think that Rawls’s “non-ideal theory” is indeed not ideal, it is also 
not a theory – it is merely a collection of dogmatic ad-hoc stipulations. 
Before going into this, however, let us have a brief look at the merits and demerits of 
the distinction itself. Simmons states: 
In its barest outline, of course, the idea behind the distinction is simple and 
appealing, no doubt accounting for the widespread acceptance of (or indifference 
toward) Rawls’s version of it: “the intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into 
two parts. The first or ideal part assumes strict compliance and works out the 
principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances.” 
[TJ, p. 245] This “ideal part presents a conception of a just society that we are to 
achieve if we can. Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of this 
conception” (TJ, p. 246). “Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be 
achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for courses of action 
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that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be 
effective.”67 
However, this distinction is anything but appealing if it is all there is with regard to 
morality in Rawls – and it is all there is. Rawls and Simmons overlook a very big part of 
morality. Morality cannot be reduced to the question of what ideal we should strive for 
and of how we can do so permissibly. Very often, at the very least, the reasons why we 
ought to do something have nothing whatsoever to do with whether the course of action 
in question advances the ideal or not. To be sure, perhaps Rawls and Simmons think this 
insight can be accommodated by referring to the impermissible – some things, they can 
admit (and they seem to admit), can be impermissible in and of themselves, for example 
torturing babies, even if they advance the ideal. Yet, this strategy does not work with 
what is permissible in itself (as opposed to what is permissible as a means to promote the 
ideal). It seems, for example, that people have a right to give their own interests in 
certain circumstances priority over advancing the ideal. That is, they may at some times 
go on a vacation, even if not doing so would not be impermissible in itself, and even if 
doing so does not advance the ideal. Of course, probably in the ideal world Rawls’s 
theory would also give individuals these rights, but given how he (and Simmons) 
distinguish “ideal” and “non-ideal theory,” this is not the case for the real world. Here 
“non-ideal theory” seems to succumb to a monistic fanaticism not too different from the 
one of utilitarianism: unless doing so would mean doing something that is impermissible 
                                                
67 Simmons, “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory,” p. 8. With “TJ” Simmons refers to the first 
edition of A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). The 
last quote is from Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 89. 
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in itself, there is one and only one thing you ought to do, namely promote the ideal.68 
I said at the beginning of this section that Rawls’s “non-ideal theory” is merely a 
collection of dogmatic ad-hoc stipulations. For Rawls does not explain how we tell the 
permissible means to achieve the ideal from the impermissible ones. After all, he cannot 
rely on the guidance of “ideal theory” there, for, as he rightly notes, “the parties [to the 
original position] are choosing a conception of justice suitable for favorable conditions,” 
but then, of course, “it is possible that [the chosen principles] no longer hold” in the real 
world.69 Thus, whatever principles, prohibitions, permissions or rights are valid in the 
ideal world, it cannot be presupposed that they also apply to the real one. 
The consequence of this logical fact is that the permissions, rights, duties and side-
constraints Rawls envisions for the real world pop up out of the blue, like Cain’s wife in 
                                                
68 A critic claimed here that Rawlsian ideal theory is allegedly “primarily” interested in 
the policies that governments should pursue and that therefore individuals will be left free 
to pursue all kinds of projects against the background of policies that aim to bring the 
society as a whole closer to the ideal. Actually, however, first, Rawls's theory is not 
primarily interested in governments but in basic structures. Second, it is also interested in 
the behavior of individuals. A Theory of Justice has two chapters entitled “Principles for 
Individuals,” and Rawls puts much emphasis on the “natural duty of justice.” Besides, in 
the quote Simmons adduces, Rawls says that “we” are to achieve the ideal. Thus, my 
point stands: it is entirely unclear where the freedom, that is, the permission to pursue all 
kinds of projects is supposed to come from if ideal and non-ideal theory in the sense of 
Simmons and Rawls is all there is. 
69 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 215-6. 
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the Bible, who seems to have been produced by some competing Genesis the reader is 
left in the dark about (the pious reader, of course, doesn’t care). This can most clearly be 
seen in Rawls’s The Law of People, where no attempt is made to actually justify the 
principles for the non-ideal world (admittedly, the “justifications” of the ideal principles 
are not particularly elaborate either). There is simply no discernible connection of the 
non-ideal principles with the ideal ones. 
While the second part of The Law of Peoples looks more like revelation than 
philosophical argument, in A Theory of Justice Rawls does make some rudimentary 
efforts to explain where the principles for the real world come from. He suggests two 
different strategies that contradict each other. As regards the first one, he states (and 
curiously Simmons does not discuss this statement in explaining Rawls’s stance towards 
“non-ideal theory” – other Rawls commentators do not pay much attention to it either): 
Non-ideal theory … is worked out after an ideal conception of justice has been 
chosen; only then do the parties [to the original position] ask which principles to 
adopt under less happy conditions.70 
The less happy conditions are “natural limitations and accidents of human life” as well 
as “injustice …, either in the social arrangements or in the conduct of individuals.”71 
Thus, we have here a variation of the original position where the assumption of strict 
compliance is dropped.  
There are two ways to interpret this quote. First, the emphasis on the sequence – first 
“ideal theory,” only then “non-ideal theory” – suggests that the parties to the non-ideal, as 
                                                
70 Ibid., p. 216. 
71 Ibid., p. 215. 
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it were, original position already have the ideal principles of justice in hand and now 
apply them to the real world (the strict compliance assumption dropped) while still 
behind a veil of ignorance. However, with such an approach Rawls simply begs the 
question. It is on the very same page, after all, that he acknowledges that the principles 
that have been chosen for ideal circumstances “might no longer hold” for the real world. 
But then to ask the parties to the non-ideal original position to happily apply them to the 
real world anyway will certainly not do. Besides, some explanation would be due as to 
what such an “application” would look like. Applying them directly would lead to 
counter-intuitive results. And since even we (Rawls and Simmons included, as I have 
argued), who are not burdened by a veil of ignorance, do not have a clue as to how to 
“indirectly apply” the principles of justice in any plausible way to the real word, the 
parties to the original position behind the veil of ignorance will not know, either. In short, 
Rawls does not solve the problem here, he only moves the bump in the carpet. 
The second interpretation relies on the fact that the quoted passage does not really 
semantically and logically imply that the parties to the non-ideal original position are 
guided in their decisions by the ideal principles. But if they are not, of course, the 
embarrassing question – a very good question, incidentally72 – arises as to why we 
shouldn’t do away with “ideal theory” altogether and let the parties behind the veil of 
ignorance make their decisions without making any idealizing assumptions in the first 
place. In other words, this second interpretation effectively does away with “ideal 
theory.” It would no longer have any discernible function. (Incidentally, you can choose 
                                                
72 See also Phillips, “Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory,” p. 
554-5, and esp. 568, n. 2. 
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an ideal to strive for even without making idealizing assumptions. I suppose, for example, 
that Rawls, when devising his “ideal,” did not really assume that we are living in a world 
of strict compliance.) 
The second strategy Rawls employs ignores the logical fact I was referring to a few 
paragraphs ago, namely the fact that you cannot import principles justified for ideal 
circumstances into the real world in order to then “bridge” the gap between ideal 
principles and the real world: after all, if there is a gap, there is a gap, so that the attempt 
to take bridging principles from the ideal world of all places ignores the very problem it 
is meant to solve. 
This is precisely what Rawls does when he discusses the alleged duty to comply with 
an unjust law and civil disobedience in the real world and in that discussion constantly 
relies on an alleged “natural duty of justice.”73 He claims that this duty would be chosen 
in the original position,74 but even if that were true, it does certainly not follow that it 
applies to the real world. Charles Beitz, incidentally, commits the same mistake. He 
claims: “Ideal justice … comes into nonideal politics by way of the natural duty to secure 
just institutions where none presently exist.”75 How that “natural duty” itself, however, 
“comes into non-ideal politics” he does not explain – nor does Rawls. 
                                                
73 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 308-12 and 319-43. 
74 Ibid., pp. 293-301. 
75 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 171. He gives this explanation in a chapter entitled 
“Applications to the Nonideal World.” The possibility that there might be no applications 
of Rawls’s theory to the real world is one he never considers. 
 43  
Even more explanations would be needed – and again are not provided – if one 
combines this mistake with the use of the second interpretation of the first strategy. Thus, 
two “cosmopolitans,” Darrell Moellendorf and Gillian Brock, defending Cosmopolitan 
Justice and Global Justice, respectively, in their books of these titles, devise an original 
position whose parties clearly do not work under the assumption of strict compliance 
(otherwise they would not deliberate about military intervention or terrorism).76 And both 
authors assume throughout their books that a natural duty of justice would be justified by 
such a procedure (along with a lot of other things). 
Their assumption is unwarranted. First of all, Rawls emphasizes that “the veil of 
ignorance excludes all knowledge of likelihoods”77 and Brock agrees, saying “that you 
should not have access to information that could lead you to deduce the odds of your 
being in some circumstances as against others”78 (and Moellendorf nowhere disagrees). 
The reason for this is that justice is supposed to be “blind.” Now, in Brock’s account the 
parties to her original position “are to participate in deciding what would be a fair 
framework for interactions and relations among the world’s inhabitants.”79 Yet, when the 
parties to the original position know that there will not be strict compliance and do not 
know any probabilities, a first question they will ask Brock is: “What difference does it 
                                                
76 Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 16-
18; Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), pp. 48-54.  
77 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 134. 
78 Brock, Global Justice, p. 49. 
79 Ibid. 
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make what framework or principles we choose?” Rawls has an easy answer to that 
question: “If you choose, for example, a principle that says that just people need to cut off 
their ears when they are 18, then you will cut off your ears when you are 18 since ex 
hypothesi there is strict compliance. That’s the difference.” What can Brock say? “If you 
choose, for example, a principle that says that just people need to cut off their ears when 
they are 18, then …” Yes, then what? Since there is no strict compliance and no 
knowledge of probabilities, absolutely nothing follows. In other words, Brock cannot 
even provide the parties to the original positions with a motivation to choose anything. 
And she can certainly not explain why people would choose cosmopolitan principles 
rather than National Socialist ones. Given the very assumptions made in the original 
position, it makes no difference what the parties will choose. The reasoning applies to 
Moellendorf, too. 
One might wish to change the original position by postulating that while choosing 
certain principles does not ensure full compliance, it makes compliance more likely. Yet, 
if you choose a natural duty to promote just institutions, then that will also make it more 
likely that you will fight for democracy in a dictatorship, and thus it will make it more 
likely that you will be killed by the dictator. Since, however, parties in the original 
position are constitutionally risk-averse, as it were, and moved by the worst case 
scenarios,80 the prospect of freedom will not outweigh the prospect of death, and so, it 
seems, you will not choose the natural duty of justice. On the other hand, if the dictator 
does not get overthrown you might be killed anyway, and other people’s trying to 
overthrow him might make this less likely. So you have a reason to vote for the natural 
                                                
80 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 148-9. 
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duty of justice. Yet, on second thought, you might be the dictator, and so other peoples’ 
trying to overthrow you might get you killed. Etc. The upshot is: without probabilities 
and without the strict compliance assumption, there is not enough data to make any 
decision. If, however, you allow the parties in the original position – throwing all of the 
Rawlsianism that was left overboard – to know the actual probabilities of their being in 
one position rather than in another and to know the actual changes the choice of certain 
principles will make to those probabilities, you will get completely counter-intuitive 
results and certainly not the results “cosmopolitans” and liberal egalitarians are looking 
for. In any case, the proposal of Moellendorf and Brock is simply incoherent.  
I conclude that both Rawlsian “ideal theory” and Rawlsian “non-ideal theory” are 
useless. There are no proposals in sight that are capable of changing that and certainly 
none are to be expected. The fact that all that Rawlsians offer us are articles claiming that 
Rawls’s theory can be applied to the real world but no articles that actually do apply it to 
the real world (in a logically conclusive way, not by means of ad hoc stipulations) is 
quite revealing in this respect. There is no reason to wait another forty years. Any moral 
theory relevant for the real world will not be Rawlsian. It is time to move on. 
A final remark: does all this teach us something about (normative) ideal theory (as 
defined here) in general, not only about Rawls’s ideal theory? Frankly, I am not 
particularly interested in this question, for the risk that in the absence of knock-down 
arguments against ideal theory new expansive ideal theories will mushroom is close to 
zero. The real danger is that Rawls’s ideal theory will be pursued further (and still more 
time will be wasted), and it is this unappealing prospect that inspired this paper. 
However, for what it is worth, I think the above considerations clearly show (and of 
 46  
course we already knew this) that limited ideal theory, that is, hypotheticals and thought 
experiments, are very useful for testing our intuitions and weeding out incorrect 
principles. They also strongly suggest, however, that all (normative) ideal theories are 
useless when it comes to directly telling us what to do, or what to regard as just, in the 
real world. Of course, I haven’t proven that with respect to ideal theory in general (and I 
had not the slightest intention to do that: this paper is directed against Rawls). But the 
burden of proof is on the other side anyway (as Rawls’s own remarks suggest), and the 
only way proponents of ideal theory can convincingly shoulder this burden is by actually 
using an ideal theory (again: in a logically conclusive way, not by means of ad hoc 
stipulations) for the purpose of directly telling us what to do in the real world. As already 
said, however, proponents of ideal theory simply do not do that. One wonders why.81 
                                                
81 I presented a first draft of this paper at the School of Law of the Torcuato di Tella 
University, Buenos Aires. I thank the audience for useful comments. I also thank Allen 
Buchanan, Holly Lawford-Smith, and Eduardo Rivera López for helpful written 
comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
